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Structures of Discrimination
Rebecca J. Cook
I. Introduction
Significant strides have been made in many regions of the world 
in the improvement of women’s status in the last half-century, but 
the challenges of achieving women’s equality worldwide are hardly 
resolved and progress is not inexorable. We have to question why we 
still take steps forward and backward in bewildering alternation. Find-
ing answers to this question requires us to address the various struc-
tures of discrimination that persist in our thinking, in our habits, and 
in our prejudices. The thesis of this essay is that, in order for women 
and men to be fully equal with each other, we need to understand the 
structures of discrimination against women; that is, the forms of the 
subordination of women that are deeply rooted in our thinking, our 
myths, and in our individual, institutional, and social ways of func-
tioning.
A fuller understanding of the overarching structures of discrimi-
nation will enable us to more effectively eliminate some of the main 
human rights infringements that women face in the 21st century, such 
as violence against women, trafficking, polygyny, illiteracy and under-
education, preventable maternal mortality and morbidity, and pre-
ventable HIV/AIDS. Like physical structures, social and psychological 
structures of discrimination and inequality are not easily dismantled. 
Their redesign takes bold leadership and innovative architects who 
appreciate the landscapes and know what kinds of habitats will enable 
women to live to their fullest potential. The redesign of oppressive 
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structures also takes dedicated workers who have the energy, patience, 
application, and perseverance that it takes to build liberating struc-
tures of equality. In thinking about how to design and build struc-
tures that enable everyone to be equal in dignity, we need to recognize 
that human dignity requires that we “acknowledge the variability of 
human beings and affirm the equal respect and concern that should be 
shown to all as they are.”1
To recognize structures of discrimination requires an understanding 
of how gender subordination is rooted, for instance, in our religions, 
cultures, media of communication, and habits, and how such struc-
tures persist over time and across sectors of life, such as the family, 
education, employment, criminal justice, and health. Like most forms 
of discrimination, gender-based discrimination is socially constructed, 
but its construction varies from other structures of discrimination. 
Gender differentials are thought to be acceptable when they are based 
on conventions that are regarded as “natural,” instead of part and 
parcel of a deliberately discriminatory structure. Groups within some 
religious communities, such as those that resist women bishops in 
the Anglican Church, insist that it is “against women’s nature” to be 
in leadership positions.2 The Roman Catholic hierarchy continues to 
rely on its self-created historical conventions in order to rationalize the 
“attempted ordination” of women as being one of the gravest crimes 
under church law, placing it in the same category as clerical sexual 
abuse of minors.3
Some gender-based distinctions are justified by genuine biological 
differences between the sexes, and therefore do not constitute discrimi-
nation. For example, distinctions made on the basis of women’s repro-
ductive functions are reasonable in order to ensure that they can access 
the care they need to go through pregnancy and childbirth safely. How-
ever, many societies have used distinctions drawn on the basis of biol-
ogy as unreasonable justifications for discrimination against women 
in areas of their lives unrelated to biological differences, such as their 
ability to learn and to exercise judgment.
One of the reasons for the lack of improvement in women’s status 
is that we have failed to develop policies that treat women’s genuine 
biological differences in ways that actually accommodate those differ-
ences, such as with respect to reproduction, while we have also failed 
to treat women equally with men when biological differences do not 
matter, such as with respect to education. In other words, if societies 
and social institutions had put the effort into safeguarding women’s 
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interests when the difference between the sexes matters (such as for 
maternal health) that they have put into discriminating against women 
when the differences between the sexes do not matter (such as for 
education and social and spiritual leadership), then the human right 
of women to equality would be considerably more advanced than it is 
today.
The continuing failure to address structures of gender discrimination 
prevents women—and also men—from realizing their full potential. 
In particular, it denies societies the benefit of the capacities, ingenu-
ities, and leadership of which their female populations are capable. 
We need to address the challenge of liberating the capacities of all of 
us by understanding the structures of perception in our minds, and 
how they lead to the formation of restrictive stereotypes of women, 
or subgroups of women. We must also address the stereotypes of men 
and subgroups of men, because, as has been explained, “Laws and cus-
toms that steer men out of the domestic sphere reinforce restrictions 
on women’s participation in the public sphere, and the maintenance of 
such role divisions perpetuates long-standing inequalities between the 
sexes.”4 In other words, the stereotypes that restrict women’s involve-
ment in the public sphere also restrict men’s fulfillment in the domestic 
sphere.
Once one understands one’s own biases, prejudices, and how one 
stereotypes, one is better equipped to engage the gender hierarchies in 
societies more generally. It is for this reason that I have focused my cur-
rent research and this essay on gender stereotyping as one of the more 
daunting structures of discrimination against women to dismantle.
Stereotyping is part of human nature. We all stereotype and we 
have all been stereotyped. Why do we stereotype? Professor Anthony 
Appiah has addressed this question in illuminating ways.5 He explains 
that we stereotype in order to maximize our understanding with a 
minimum of effort, to achieve simplicity and predictability, to assign 
difference, and to script identities. Stereotyping is not necessarily 
problematic, particularly when it is used to maximize simplicity and 
predictability. Stereotyping can, for example, be a useful tool to help 
process the social complexity of the world, particularly as it globalizes.6 
While stereotyping is not inherently problematic, it becomes problem-
atic when it operates unjustly, such as through assigning difference 
or scripting identities in ways that ignore the characteristics, abilities, 
needs, wishes, and circumstances of individuals, with the effect of 
denying them their rights.7
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In stereotyping to maximize predictability, we feel comforted by 
the familiarity that arises from repeated general characterizations.8 In 
stereotyping to ensure simplicity, we often make statistical general-
izations about people, such as that women are generally physically 
weaker than men. Statistical or descriptive generalizations become 
problematic when they are relied upon to deny a benefit to, or impose 
a burden upon, a particular woman who is atypical for that group to 
which the generalization is applied. Therefore, it is unjust and discrim-
inatory when a particular woman is denied, for instance, a farming job, 
on the basis of the stereotypical belief that women are physically weak 
and therefore lack the strength needed to be a farmer, even though 
that particular woman is physically able to be a farmer. As the Con-
stitutional Court of South Africa explained: “At the very least, what 
is statistically normal ceases to be the basis for establishing what is 
legally normative…What becomes normal in an open society, then, is 
not an imposed and standardised form of behaviour that refuses to 
acknowledge difference, but the acceptance of the principle of differ-
ence itself.”9
We stereotype to assign difference, to label people because they are 
different from the norms with which we are familiar. We label people 
because we do not want to take the time to know them as individu-
als. The tendency is to put them into categories and deal with them 
according to those categories, not as individuals with particular needs, 
characteristics, and abilities. These stereotypes are sometimes called 
“false stereotypes.” We often use these stereotypes for hostile pur-
poses, such as against members of new immigrant groups or groups 
other than our own. We “otherize” members of groups particularly 
when we want to feel superior. False stereotypes stigmatize members 
of a group by branding them with negative characteristics, irrespective 
of whether they have those characteristics, thus denying them their 
dignity or individual worth.
Stereotypes that seek to script identities are often called “norma-
tive” or “prescriptive” stereotypes. The underlying reason for these 
stereotypes is to prescribe attributes, roles, and behaviors to which 
men and women are expected to conform. An illustration of prescrip-
tive stereotyping is the expectation that women conform to prevailing 
modesty, chastity, and obedience codes. All societies have such codes, 
including those that are embedded in dress codes that, for instance, 
require or expect women to wear high-heeled shoes or headscarves.
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Let me proceed by addressing various forms of gender stereotyp-
ing, including how this phenomenon creates gender hierarchies by 
constructing women as inferior to men. In addition, I will explore how 
stereotyping persists in different sectors of social activity in ways that 
have denied individual women their rights.
II. Gender Stereotyping
How many of us realize that negative stereotyping denies individuals 
their dignity and their self-esteem in ways that are never to be erased? 
Uncovering how laws, policies, and practices apply, enforce, or perpet-
uate stereotypes of both women and men is critical to understanding 
the gendered experiences of discrimination and inequality. Examining 
how women and men are stereotyped in various contexts can provide 
insight into the ways that the genders are disadvantaged in the exer-
cise of their rights.
It is important to consider how both men and women are stereo-
typed, by reference to the terms “gender stereotype” and “gender ste-
reotyping.” The term “gender stereotype” describes a generalized view 
or preconception of attributes or characteristics possessed by women 
and men, or the roles that are or should be performed by each respec-
tively.10 In this view, a gender stereotype presumes that all individuals 
in the social groups of women or men possess certain characteristics or 
capacities, behave in certain different ways, and/or perform specific, 
predetermined distinguishable roles. The term “gender stereotyping” 
describes the process of ascribing to an individual woman or man cer-
tain capacities, characteristics, or roles only by reason of membership 
in the social group of women or men respectively.11
History has shown that gender stereotyping has had particularly 
egregious consequences for women. Professor Sandra Fredman has 
observed that:
[A] useful way of examining the continued disadvantage of women is to 
identify the assumptions and stereotypes which have been central to the 
perpetuation and legitimation of women’s legal and social subordina-
tion. Such assumptions have roots which stretch deep into the history of 
ideas, yet continue to influence the legal and social structure of modern 
society. Indeed, the continuity is startling, given the extent and funda-
mental nature of change in the political and economic context.12
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This observation notes how stereotypes remain long after the reality 
that generated them has changed. They impair the ability of the indi-
viduals and institutions that retain them to function effectively in the 
new reality.
Stereotypes can also have harmful consequences for men, particu-
larly when men challenge the stereotypes of women as caregivers and 
men as breadwinners. There are numerous court cases brought by 
men who were denied various forms of assistance because, as caregiv-
ers in their circumstances, they did not meet the male stereotype of 
breadwinner. Cases include that of Mr. Wiesenfeld from New Jersey, 
who was denied assistance from the social security system that would 
have allowed him to stay home to take care of his first-born infant son. 
When his wife died giving birth to their son, he applied for mother’s 
benefits, a form of assistance designed to enable widows, but not wid-
owers, to stay at home with their children after the death of the family 
breadwinner.13
Another case involved Mr. Hibbs from Nevada, who was denied the 
twelve-week family care leave (to which women were entitled) to stay 
at home to take care of his ailing wife.14 A further case involved Mr. 
Petrovic, a student from Austria working part time, who was denied 
a parental leave allowance under the Austrian Unemployment Benefit 
Act, to stay at home and take care of his child while his wife contin-
ued working.15 His claim was that the distinction in the Austrian Act, 
allowing only mothers to take a leave when a child was born, was dis-
criminatory.
Mr. Wiesenfeld and Mr. Hibbs were successful before the U.S. 
Supreme Court when they challenged the respective denials as uncon-
stitutional. In Wiesenfeld, the Court went beyond simply deciding the 
case as an equal pay case, wrongfully denying working men the ben-
efits that were provided to working women. It decided that the state is 
precluded by the Equal Protection provision of the U.S. Constitution 
from imposing sex-role stereotypes of male breadwinner-female care-
giver. The Court similarly affirmed Mr. Hibbs’ gender-nonconforming 
choice to stay at home to take care of his wife because “sex-role stereo-
typing was a constitutional problem of such magnitude that it justified 
an affirmative grant of twelve weeks leave. Had Congress attempted to 
combat such discrimination simply by requiring formal equality in the 
administration of leave benefits, employers would have been able to 
comply with the law by offering no family leave to employees of either 
sex.”16 That is, in order to achieve real or substantive equality, the 
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Court had to secure family care benefits for women and extend them 
to men in order to remedy the sex role stereotypes.17
In contrast to Mr. Wiesenfeld and Mr. Hibbs, Mr. Petrovic was 
unsuccessful before the European Court of Human Rights. The Euro-
pean Court missed an opportunity to explain how the Austrian Act 
restricting family care leave to only mothers violated the rights of 
nondiscrimination of both sexes. Such restrictions devalue the efforts 
of mothers who stay in the workforce, and denigrate the domestic con-
tributions of fathers. In this sense, stereotypes of women and men can 
have mutually reinforcing negative consequences.
Conditions for social stratification and the subordination of women 
exist when practices, such as gender stereotyping, are both socially per-
vasive across sectors and socially persistent over time.18 The conditions 
for social stratification and subordination are exacerbated when ste-
reotypes are institutionalized in a state’s laws, policies, and practices. 
An example is the widespread institutionalization, through judicial 
reasoning, of sexual stereotypes of women that excuse and rationalize 
sexual assault; for instance, that women who do not fight back against 
sexual assault are consenting to the aggressor’s acts.19 The saturation 
of law with sexual stereotypes, such as the stereotype that women are 
in a state of perpetual consent to men’s initiation of sexual activity, has 
contributed to the frequent blaming of victims and survivors of sexual 
assault20 and, for example, the denial of female sexual agency and the 
privileging of male sexuality.21 This affirms the stereotype that “boys 
will be boys,” and does nothing to dismantle the stereotype of men as 
creatures who are unable to control their sexual urges.
There are many forms of gender stereotypes. Sex stereotypes con-
cern generalizations about women’s and men’s physical, emotional, 
and cognitive capacities. Sexual stereotypes concern those “character-
istics or qualities that play a role in sexual attraction and desire, sexual 
initiation and intercourse, sexual intimacy, sexual possession, sexual 
assault…sexual objectification and exploitation.”22 Sex role stereotypes 
ascribe roles to women and men that are perceived as culturally appro-
priate to each of them, based on prevailing gender ideologies.23 These 
stereotypes often combine with other characteristics, such as race, age 
or immigrant status, to create compounded stereotypes, such as gener-
alizations about adolescent girls or Muslim women.
Gender stereotypes are shaped by the contexts in which they oper-
ate. In order to accurately diagnose and effectively remedy them it is 
therefore important to understand the underlying contexts in which 
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they are applied, enforced, or perpetuated. One approach to under-
standing the context in which a gender stereotype operates is to think 
about it in terms of individual factors, situational factors in different 
sectors of society, and broader factors.24 Understanding these condi-
tioning influences can help to explain how gender stereotyping con-
tributes to social stratification and the subordination of women,25 how 
stereotyping is perpetuated, and the process by which it might be 
eliminated.26
As individuals,27 we absorb stereotypes through our everyday inter-
actions with people and our exposure to the culture in which we 
function.28 Repeated encounters embed stereotypes deep into our sub-
conscious minds,29 where we (often) come to accept them uncritically 
as our “normal” understanding of the world, and we begin to act and 
react in conformity with them.30
Situational factors31 provide insights into how an individual is 
“affected by and adapts to social contexts, ranging from proximal influ-
ences (e.g., the norms of one’s immediate work group) to more distal 
influences (e.g., the division of male and female roles in society).”32 In 
the health sector, for instance, stereotypes about women have emerged 
in regard to their capacity to make free and informed decisions about 
their health care, exercise moral agency to make decisions about their 
reproduction and sexuality, balance influences of rationality and 
emotionalism, and exercise autonomy to determine their own roles in 
society.
Broader factors,33 such as historical, cultural, religious, and legal con-
siderations, can provide insights into how a community integrates 
gender stereotypes into its social structures and meanings, as well as 
how such stereotypes might be eliminated.34
Understanding the various means of perpetuating gender stereo-
types in different sectors of society is critical to dismantling them.35 
When a state applies, enforces, or perpetuates a gender stereotype in 
its laws, policies, or practices, or fails to adopt legal and other mea-
sures to eliminate and remedy wrongful gender stereotyping through 
means such as public advertisements and public school curricula or 
textbooks, it institutionalizes that stereotype and gives it the force of 
the law or of public approval and authority. As an influential and 
instructive institution of the state, the law may condone the operation 
of a gender stereotype and create an environment of legitimacy and 
impunity around its use. When a state legitimizes a harmful gender 
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stereotype in this way, it creates a framework that enables the perpetu-
ation of discrimination against women.
The ability to eliminate harmful stereotyping is contingent on the 
wrong first being named.36 To borrow a medical metaphor, an ailment 
needs first to be diagnosed in order for it to be treated.37 Exposing 
operative stereotypes, examining their origins, contexts, and processes 
of perpetuation, and analyzing how their application, enforcement, or 
perpetuation harms individuals or groups of individuals, are critical to 
their remedy.38 Once wrongful stereotyping has been recognized, it is 
then possible to identify whether, and if so how, operative stereotypes 
impair or nullify rights to non-discrimination and equality, and/or vio-
late other human rights.39 Let me now explore how gender stereotypes 
have been named, and once identified, how they have been shown to 
infringe upon human rights in the sectors of criminal justice, health, 
and the family.
III. Gendered Disappearances and Criminal Justice
The issue of how stereotyping of young, poor migrant women in the 
criminal justice system of the city of Juarez, Mexico, was associated 
with their gendered disappearances was addressed by the Inter-Amer-
ican Court of Human Rights (the Court) in its recent decision in the 
so-called Cotton Field case.40 That decision held the state of Mexico 
responsible under the American Convention on Human Rights (the 
Convention) and the Convention on Prevention, Punishment and 
Eradication of Violence against Women (the Convention Belém do 
Pará) because the police failed to investigate the disappearances and 
murders of three poor, migrant women, two of whom were minors. 
The bodies of these three women, Claudia Ivette Gonzalez, Esmeralda 
Herrera Monreal, and Laura Berenice Ramos Monarrez, were found in 
a cotton field near Juarez, the Mexican town bordering El Paso, Texas, 
in the Mexican state of Chihuahua.
The decision is important for a number of reasons. For the first time, 
the Court considered the positive obligations of states to respond to 
violence against women by private actors. It also looked at the mur-
ders of these three women in the context of mass violence against 
women and structural discrimination, and found that gender-based 
violence constitutes gender discrimination. The Court decided that the 
state violated the obligations under the Convention not to discriminate 
(Article 1(1)) in connection with the obligation to guarantee the right 
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to life (Article 4(1)); the right to physical, mental and moral integrity 
(Article 5(1)); the right to be free from inhuman or degrading treatment 
(Article 5(2)); and the right to personal liberty and security (Article 
7(1)). These multiple violations operated to the detriment of the three 
victims. In addition, the Court found the state in violation of the vic-
tims’ next of kin’s right of access to justice and to a fair trial (Article 
8(1)), and to simple, prompt, effective recourse (Article 25(1)) to protec-
tions of the Convention.41
In presenting the facts of the case, the Court included a section 
entitled, “Stereotyping allegedly manifested by officials to the victims’ 
next of kin.”42 This referenced the testimony of the victims’ mothers to 
show how state officials had generated demeaning and hostile sexual 
stereotypes of the victims’ roles, attributes, and characteristics, in part 
to justify their avoidance of their obligations to investigate. The Court 
cited testimony of Esmeralda Herrera’s mother, who said that when she 
reported her daughter’s disappearance, the authorities told her that the 
young woman “had not disappeared, but was out with her boyfriends 
or wandering around with friends,” and “that if anything happened to 
her, it was because she was looking for it, because a good girl, a good 
woman, stays at home.”43 Importantly, the Court concluded that, “the 
comments made by officials that the victims had gone off with a boy-
friend or that they led a disreputable life…constitute stereotyping.”44
In the section of its judgment entitled, “Obligation not to discrimi-
nate: violence against women as discrimination,” the Court found that 
“gender stereotyping refers to a preconception of personal attributes, 
characteristics or roles that correspond or should correspond to either 
men or women.”45 The Court then referred to the statements made 
by the state officers in order to identify how hostile and dismissive 
stereotypes were perpetuated in the particular context of the police 
authorities: “Bearing in mind the statements made by the State…the 
subordination of women can be associated with practices based on 
persistent socially-dominant gender stereotypes, a situation that is 
exacerbated when the stereotypes are reflected, implicitly or explicitly, 
in policies and practices and, particularly, in the reasoning and lan-
guage of the judicial police authorities, as in this case.”46
Significantly, the Court concluded this section by saying that, “The 
creation and use of stereotypes becomes one of the causes and con-
sequences of gender-based violence against women.”47 This judicial 
recognition of harmful gender stereotyping in the criminal justice sys-
tem, and how it contributed to official indifference to the gendered 
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disappearances and murders of women in Juarez, has no doubt raised 
consciousness about this phenomenon in Mexico and beyond. Hope-
fully, the Cotton Field decision will promote better understanding of 
women’s collective experiences of one of the more pernicious forms of 
the social practice of gender stereotyping and discrimination in other 
parts of the world, such as Canada, where comparable stereotyping of 
gendered disappearances of indigenous women prevails.48
IV. Health Disparities
Women regularly face obstacles in accessing health care services and 
information, especially in the area of reproductive health. The nature, 
frequency, and immutability of obstacles vary greatly, depending on 
such factors as a woman’s socio-economic status, age, race, religion, 
sexual orientation, and geographical location. A woman might have 
difficulty gaining timely access, perhaps, to emergency contraception 
due to the refusal of her only accessible pharmacist to provide this 
contraceptive on grounds of conscience.49 Such a refusal is based on 
the stereotype of women as morally inferior and lacking the capacity 
for moral agency.50 Similarly, opponents of abortion rights, in sup-
port of their efforts to abolish, redirect, or restrict women’s access to 
abortion, have sought to perpetuate the stereotype of women as weak 
and vulnerable, and therefore in need of their protection.51 The stereo-
type of women as incompetent decision-makers in their own reproduc-
tive lives has been enforced through laws, policies, and practices that, 
among other matters, allow the forcible sterilization of women, partic-
ularly members of minority, immigrant, or indigenous communities.52
The stereotype of women as primarily mothers has been applied, 
enforced, and perpetuated through laws, policies, or practices that 
deny or restrict women’s access to affordable contraceptives and 
related health care services and information.53 An extreme example of 
such denials is shown in the Philippines through an Executive Order 
issued by the mayor of Manila City that prohibited the distribution 
of hormonal contraceptives in the public health service.54 The Execu-
tive Order sends a clear message that women’s natural role and des-
tiny is as mothers, meaning that women should prioritize childbearing 
and childrearing over all other roles they might perform or choose in 
that community. The implication is that women in Manila City should 
be treated primarily as mothers (whether actual or potential), and 
not according to their individual needs or possible preferences not 
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to become mothers. According to this stereotypical thinking, it is not 
essential that women have access to affordable methods of artificial 
contraception since this could potentially deny women the opportu-
nity to fulfill their “duties” as mothers, even though birth spacing is 
a key component to reduce rates of maternal mortality and morbidity, 
which is often central to the survival and well-being of children.55
In order to understand the stereotypes applied through the Execu-
tive Order, it is important to consider the contextual factors that sur-
rounded its application.56 To elaborate, at the time the Executive Order 
was introduced there had been a “growing Catholicization of pub-
lic health policies.”57 Several prominent state figures, including then 
national President Arroyo, justified the Order on the grounds that 
denying women access to artificial contraceptives is consistent with the 
teachings of the Catholic Church on family planning.58 State officials 
imposed their stereotyped views about women’s proper role by invok-
ing the exclusively male-generated doctrines of Catholicism.
It is also significant that the Executive Order was introduced in the 
broader context of a legal culture that perpetuates stereotypes within 
family and marriage relations with impunity. For example, the Family 
Code of the Philippines bolsters the prescriptive stereotype that men 
should be the decision-makers and therefore bear ultimate power and 
authority within their families.59 In the case of disagreements over 
marital property or parental authority over children, the Family Code 
provides that the husband’s/father’s decision shall prevail over the 
wife’s/mother’s preferences. The Executive Order reinforces the stereo-
types that married women should be constantly prepared to be moth-
ers, that husbands should constantly welcome fatherhood, and that 
both should be constantly obedient to the Catholic Church.
Situational factors include the widespread state practice of reward-
ing women, through monetary compensation and other gifts, for ste-
reotype-conforming behavior (i.e., for fulfilling their natural “destiny” 
to be mothers). This, in turn, has facilitated the institutionalization 
of the stereotype of women primarily as mothers.60 For example, one 
report has described how “[t]he mayor [of Manila City] gives prizes 
for having the most number of children, and the current champion has 
21 kids.”61 In addition, the state practice of harassing and intimidating 
health care providers who give women access to contraceptives has 
further facilitated the stereotype’s institutionalization. These practices 
have enabled the imposition of the state’s views of women’s “proper” 
role in society, restricting women to the role of motherhood and the 
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behavior expected of mothers (e.g., the prioritization of the needs of 
children over women). This has taken place even when those practices 
pose well-recognized, serious—even fatal—risks to women’s health,62 
and frustrate women’s exercise of their human rights other than to vol-
untary motherhood.
V. Disparities in the Family
Prescriptive stereotypes of women’s “proper” role in the family have 
enabled the perpetuation of disparities in family life. One of the more 
extreme forms of such disparities is the practice of polygyny; that is, 
the practice of a man taking multiple wives.63 The term “polygamy” 
refers to the simultaneous union of either a husband or wife to multiple 
spouses. As a general term, polygamy therefore includes both the rare 
practice of polyandry, a wife taking multiple husbands, and polygyny, 
the more frequent circumstance of a husband taking multiple wives.
There has been a renewed interest in the disparities associated with 
polygynous “marriages”; that is, social unions approximating mar-
riage even if not legally recognized as such. This interest has arisen 
in the wake of recently published books on the actual experience of 
polygyny in North America,64 several U.S. court decisions on the prac-
tice of polygyny,65 and a pending reference case in Canada regarding 
the constitutionality of its criminal prohibition of polygyny.66
Beyond North America, the South African Constitutional Court has 
recently held that Muslim women in polygynous marriages should be 
able to inherit equally with Muslim women in monogamous marriages 
and with non-Muslim women, despite provisions in the South African 
Intestate Succession Act of South Africa.67 In deciding the legal effect of 
this Act, the Court explained that:
By discriminating against women in polygynous Muslim marriages on 
the grounds of religion, gender and marital status, the Act clearly rein-
forces a pattern of stereotyping and patriarchal practices that relegates 
women in these marriages to being unworthy of protection. Needless 
to say, by so discriminating against those women, the provisions in the 
Act conflict with the principle of gender equality which the Constitution 
strives to achieve. That cannot, and ought not, be countenanced in a soci-
ety based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human 
rights.68
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Religious and customary laws that permit polygyny continue to rely 
on sex differences as a central axis in the distribution of marital rights 
and obligations. In doing so, they are premised upon and perpetuate 
gender stereotypes hostile to women’s equality that have been rejected 
in many laws.69 The content of such gender stereotypes varies accord-
ing to the particular legal system under which polygyny continues 
to be practiced. In general, however, a dominant sexual and sex role 
stereotype of women in polygynous unions is as “wife” and “mother.” 
Each of these roles, including the sexual component of “wife,” sup-
ports and reinforces the other. They mark married women as different 
types of persons from men.
Historically, the common law of coverture also distributed marital 
rights and obligations unequally according to sex, in favor of hus-
bands’ control of their wives’ property.70 Persons of different sex were 
understood to be different types of persons under the laws of marriage. 
A wife was understood to be subsumed within her husband’s legal per-
sonality, under his family name. Children of a marriage were under-
stood to fall under the name and the near-complete custodial power 
of their father, affording him control of their educational, religious, 
and other forms of upbringing. Stereotypes of feminine dependence, 
fragility, and commercial naivety were constructed in opposition to 
stereotypes of masculine protective breadwinning and financial acu-
men. An increasing number of family laws regulating marriage and 
cohabitation have since moved away from this expressly sex-based 
construction of family relations. Spousal rights and obligations in the 
legal systems of some Western countries now apply to both parties 
equally regardless of sex.71 In fact, the legislative adoption of same-sex 
marriage has removed the notion of sex difference as essential to mar-
riage altogether.72
Depending on the relevant customary or religious system that 
retains polygyny as an acceptable institution, it may be that the role 
of “wife” implies continuous sexual availability to one’s husband, as 
it once did under laws that did not criminalize rape in marriage.73 
Also, when a wife is sexually unavailable, such as during pregnancy or 
post-partum abstinence in some contexts, polygyny can function uni-
laterally to satisfy a husband’s “natural” masculine “sexual needs.”74 
Abstinence is not a stereotypical expectation of men.
It may also be a condition of “wifehood” under such a system that 
one becomes a mother. The role of “mother” often has a more bur-
densome construction in the polygynous context than in the monog-
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amous one. Where polygyny is practiced as a means to maximize 
reproduction by husbands, wives are understood primarily as pro-
creators. Moreover, wives may be limited in their ability to determine 
the number and spacing of children, and therefore unable to protect 
their health and their very lives, in violation of their “rights to decide 
freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children 
and to have access to the information, education and means to enable 
them to exercise these rights….”75 The wife in a polygynous family has 
been described as “operating as a passive being for procreation.”76 The 
notion that one might be a spouse, without choosing to be a parent, 
is foreclosed where polygyny is practiced for the express purpose of 
maximizing family and community reproduction.
There is evidence that maximizing reproduction is one of the theo-
logical principles of polygyny as still practiced among fundamental-
ist Mormon groups in Canada and the United States.77 Within the 
polygynous community in Bountiful, British Columbia, for instance, 
religious teachings regarding polygyny negatively stereotype women 
and female children into solely reproductive and subservient roles. 
As one former polygynous wife of this sect has articulated, religious 
doctrine maintained that she, like all girls and women, had the duty 
to contribute to the “production” of an abundance of children through 
polygynous marriage in order for the community to survive the pend-
ing Apocalypse.78 At the centre of this patriarchal, religious dictum lies 
a belief that women and girls are meant to serve men, and should they 
disobey, “their souls will burn in hell for eternity.”79
The centrality of motherhood (to serve the purpose of creating 
fatherhood) is similarly evident in some of the religious and customary 
norms governing marriage among Islamic and African communities. 
Infertility of the first wife, or her “inability” to bear a son, is often con-
sidered a sufficient reason for a court (or the first wife) to grant permis-
sion to a man to take an additional wife. A court or an earlier wife may 
also approve a husband taking an additional wife when a second or 
later wife fails to produce a male child. It has been noted that, “child-
less women are often sneered at for their inability to conceive. If not 
divorced, lack of reproductive capacity is a justification for polygamy 
amongst some people….”80 In a study of Bedouin Arab polygynous 
wives, having too many daughters was one of the four main reasons 
cited for why a husband took an additional wife.81
If polygynous wives and mothers do not fulfill the prescribed roles 
of procreator and satisfier of men’s sexual urges, they may be deval-
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ued in the family and community. The inherent wrong of this sex role 
stereotype is that it prohibits a woman from making or fairly negoti-
ating her own life plan in ways that are equal to her husband’s abil-
ity to determine his life course. Male-factor infertility, which medical 
evidence shows to be as common as female-factor infertility, is denied. 
The stereotypical view is that a couple’s infertility is generally attribut-
able to the woman’s deficiency.
Stereotypes of women in polygynous marriages persist in the immi-
gration context. The trend in immigration laws and policies in coun-
tries committed to monogamy is to prohibit the entry of polygynous 
families. In the immigration laws of Australia,82 Canada,83 the U.K.,84 
and the U.S.,85 for instance, polygamy is a bar to immigration. The 
approaches countries take to ensure that only monogamous families 
immigrate vary and can have profound implications for the perpetu-
ation of harmful stereotypes of immigrant women. Some countries, 
such as Australia and Canada, provide that only the first marriage may 
potentially be recognized for immigration purposes. Australia86 and 
Canada87 therefore require that the sponsoring spouse provide evi-
dence of lawful divorce of any subsequent concurrent wives.
In contrast, the U.K.88 and U.S.89 allow the husband to determine 
which of his two or more wives he will bring. In the U.K., it is the order 
in which polygamous wives come to the U.K. for settlement (not the 
order in which they married the husband) that is the decisive factor for 
determining which wife is recognized as the lawful spouse for immi-
gration purposes.90 The U.S. immigration policy “permits the husband 
in a polygamous marriage to sponsor a first wife without terminating 
subsequent marriages. A husband may sponsor a second or subsequent 
wife, provided he terminates all previous marriages and then remar-
ries the beneficiary spouse to satisfy the requirement that the mar-
riage is valid for immigration purposes.”91 It has been explained that, 
“the operation of U.S. immigration policy for spouse-based categories 
empowers a husband in a polygamous marriage to choose which wife 
he will sponsor for immigration status; in contrast, a second or sub-
sequent wife cannot confer or receive status for any family category 
based on a relationship created solely by the polygamous marriage.”92
It has been observed that, “Much of the gender bias in [U.S.] immi-
gration law is a legacy of the centuries-old doctrine of coverture, under 
which a woman’s legal existence merged with that of her husband 
upon marriage.”93 This provides insights into the gendered nature of 
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immigration policies and how stereotypes of women as dependent, 
subordinate people are perpetuated:
At common law, a husband had ownership rights over his wife and was 
legally entitled to control her income and property…This headship of 
the husband in the family permitted him to control where the wife and 
family resided and all aspects of their existence…The very structure of 
the spouse-based immigration scheme grew out of this doctrine [cover-
ture]. The first laws establishing the right of a citizen or resident alien to 
petition on behalf of a spouse were gender-specific—only male citizens 
and male resident aliens could sponsor their spouses; female citizens or 
resident aliens enjoyed no reciprocal rights to sponsor their husbands.94
The U.K. and U.S. approaches give almost absolute power to the hus-
band in a polygynous marriage who is a citizen or permanent resident 
in a destination country. It permits “the husband to determine not only 
the immigration status of each wife, but also where each wife will live, 
whether that wife can live with and have custody of her children, and 
whether that wife can work if she is in the United States. These are the 
very powers bestowed upon a husband under the doctrine of cover-
ture.”95 The U.S., the U.K., and countries with comparable immigration 
and related laws have thereby failed to break the links of their histori-
cal stereotyping.
VI. Dismantling Harmful Gender Stereotyping
You might well be asking how harmful stereotypes can be dismantled, 
and by whom. We all have a role to play in dismantling stereotypes, in 
particular by raising our own consciousness about how we stereotype 
and how we have been stereotyped. Raising awareness in our own 
situations can have humorous sides: How does a woman respond to a 
male colleague who turns to her in a meeting and asks her to take the 
secretarial role of taking notes? How does a female vice president of a 
university respond to a male professor who asks her to get him a drink 
at a university cocktail reception? Such anecdotes could be developed 
into humorous movies that elaborate different response scenarios.
I suspect many of you have your favourite movies about stereotypes 
that have captured your imagination in ways that other forms of com-
munication have not. One of my favourite films is Bend it Like Beck-
ham, about an adolescent girl who defied her community’s feminine 
stereotype in order to become a skilled soccer player like her model, 
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David Beckham.96 Women’s sports is a way to break stereotypes of 
women as weak and vulnerable. However, women’s sports are not 
far removed from gender roles and stereotypes, because women are 
more restricted in the kind of aggressive behaviour in which they can 
engage. For example, body-checking is not allowed in women’s ice 
hockey. Rewarding men’s aggression and winning at any cost has led 
to the observation that men’s “college sports culture is fostering…an 
increase in violence and dirty tricks.”97 This culture of sports violence 
presents a challenge as women seek equality in the recognition and 
rewards of their sporting accomplishments.
We all have a role to play in ensuring that our educational institu-
tions do not perpetuate gender stereotypes in how their admissions 
policies are structured, in how their curricula are designed, and in how 
leadership is fostered. Some years ago, a Mr. Hogan challenged the 
Mississippi University for Women because it denied him, a qualified 
male applicant, admission to its all-female nursing program, because 
of his sex. He won before the U.S. Supreme Court because his denial 
violated the Equal Protection clause of the U.S. Constitution.98
In Australia, the Court of Appeals of New South Wales held that 
it was discriminatory to segregate students in single sex schools in 
which boys were given courses that equipped them for university, 
commerce, and industry, while girls had courses in domestic science 
and home economics. The Court found that these curricula differences 
unlawfully reflected sex-role stereotypes of men working in business, 
industry, and manufacturing as breadwinners, and women working 
as homemakers. The result was that this limited girls’ future choices 
about education, vocations, and careers.99
We do not have to wait for brave individuals to challenge education 
policies before courts of law. We can proceed by reviewing how we 
teach in the classroom, for example, by asking colleagues to sit in on 
classes and advise us on how we can ensure that we are not reinforcing 
negative or restrictive gender stereotypes by the way we teach.
In addition to humour, films, sports, and education as methods 
of raising consciousness about harmful stereotypes, various human 
rights systems are instrumental in acknowledging negative stereo-
types, exposing their harms, and providing remedies. In the Mexican 
“Cotton Field” case, we saw how the Inter-American Court recognized 
how prejudice about women is perpetuated in the criminal justice sys-
tem through categorical thinking about women’s appropriate roles, 
attributes, and characteristics in society, as well as how that thinking 
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discriminates against them and denies justice and protection when 
confronted by gross violations of their rights.
To its great credit, in the part of its judgment on Reparations, the 
Inter-American Court called for training that enables all state officials 
to recognize the effect on women of stereotyped ideas and opinions in 
relation to the meaning and scope of human rights.100 It ordered the 
state “to continue implementing permanent education and training 
programs and courses in: (i) human rights and gender; (ii) a gender 
perspective for due diligence in conducting preliminary investigations 
and judicial proceedings in relation to the discrimination, abuse and 
murder of women based on their gender, and (iii) elimination of ste-
reotypes of women’s roles in society.”101
The Court’s members were greatly assisted in their work by fact-
finding reports about the disappearances of women more generally, 
undertaken by nongovernmental organizations102 and human rights 
bodies established by human rights treaties to monitor state compli-
ance.103 The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (the CEDAW Committee), the U.N. treaty body established to 
monitor the compliance of states with the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),104 used 
its inquiry procedures to investigate the grave and systematic nature 
of the gendered disappearances.105 States are obligated under CEDAW 
Article 5(a) to address “prejudices and customary and all other prac-
tices” that are based on concepts of “the inferiority or superiority of 
either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.” This 
Article 5(a) wording is quoted by the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights,106 established to monitor the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and in the Protocol to 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa.107
Thanks to the fact-finding report by several nongovernmental orga-
nizations that exposed the harmful effects of the Manila City Executive 
Order,108 the CEDAW Committee is currently undertaking an Inquiry 
Report into the grave and systematic effects of the Manila City Ordi-
nance on women’s health and equality.
States that have ratified CEDAW, known as States Parties, have an 
obligation to report to the CEDAW Committee on a periodic basis on 
what they have done to bring their laws, policies, and practices into 
compliance with the Convention. As a guide to states for preparing 
their reports, the CEDAW Committee explained that, “States parties’ 
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obligation is to address prevailing gender relations and the persistence 
of gender-based stereotypes that affect women not only through indi-
vidual acts by individuals but also in law, and legal and societal struc-
tures and institutions.”109
In applying this mandate to the issue of polygyny, the CEDAW 
Committee has consistently articulated the need to eliminate cultural, 
customary, and legal norms that perpetuate the practice. The CEDAW 
Committee views polygyny as a harmful traditional practice,110 and 
encourages states to analyze traditions, customs, and stereotypes of 
women’s roles in the family that contribute to the continuation of its 
practice.111 In its Concluding Observations on the report of one state 
party, the Committee noted its concern about:
the prevalence in the State party of a patriarchal ideology with firmly 
entrenched stereotypes and the persistence of deep-rooted adverse cul-
tural norms, customs and traditions, including forced and early marriage, 
[and] polygamy…that discriminate against women, result in limitation 
to women’s educational and employment opportunities and constitute 
serious obstacles to women’s enjoyment of their human rights.112
To combat such stereotypes, the CEDAW Committee encouraged 
public-awareness campaigns “to eliminate the gap between statutory 
law and social customs and practices, especially with regard to fam-
ily law.”113 This may be required for women in polygynous unions in 
states where family practices do not accord with statutory law. In par-
ticular, the Committee’s direction that state parties have an obligation 
to ensure “women’s awareness of their rights”114 is relevant to those 
states where some women may be unaware of the legal protections 
available to them, should they wish to leave polygynous unions.
VII. Concluding Thoughts
There is no doubt that global priorities, such as terrorism, financial cri-
ses, and climate change, have eclipsed the priority of women’s issues. 
We need to reconfigure women’s issues in view of changing global 
dynamics, but we must start by restructuring our own categorical 
thinking. Understanding how stereotyping takes place in our minds, 
how it is facilitated in particular contexts, and how it is fueled by the 
practices of social institutions, courts of law, the media, and differ-
ent religious and cultural ideologies provides insight into how societ-
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ies subordinate women and, sometimes, men. In opening our eyes to 
gender distinctions derived from social practices and to how societies 
inequitably construct gender differences, we will be better equipped to 
address the challenge of overcoming the many manifestations of struc-
tural discrimination. •
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